\*ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File\*

31 July 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DIDECTOR

FROM:

Assistant Director, OCD


SUBJECT:

CIA Liaison with Department of the Army. Specifically: G-2's Project 4831 - Summary of Intelligence Reference

Data - Revision of 1 July 1950. (TOP SECRET)

1. General Bolling, by memorandum dated 30 June 1950, informed you that "in a conversation with (CIA's liaison officers) I could find no specific instance other than a telecon that was withheld from your Agency, inasmuch as the telecon referred to was an operational matter and not within the province of intelligence. I understand that this was subsequently released. ... (CIA's liaison officers) will be furnished all information of an intelligence nature automatically or upon request."

- 2. I informed you orally that our liaison officers had in fact referred to several categories of materials which G-2 had withheld, including most notably the G-2 "Projects". One of our liaison officers had learned of the existence of these projects, and about three months ago he found out that one of them, with the title "Project 4831", was published at monthly intervals. This particular Project was said to contain G-2's best and most current estimates of the military potential of all nations. The liaison officer's request for a copy of this paper, three months ago, was denied with the statement that it was published in very few copies and none could be given to CIA. The liaison officer was questioned very closely in an effort to find out how he had learned about the existence of "Project 4831".
- 3. In early July, after receipt of General Bolling's memorandum quoted in paragraph (1) above, the liaison officer made further efforts to obtain a copy of "Project 4831". Again the oral request was turned down, and again he was questioned as to how he knew about this paper. In view of the very effective steps which General Bolling had taken to ensure a more cooperative attitude toward CIA on the part of his subordinates, we held off until late July before sending a formal collection directive for a copy of the Project. We were getting favorable action on a number of requests of a sort which formerly had always been refused, and it seemed unwise to make too much of an issue about a paper which we had never seen, and whose nature and contents were known to us only by scuttlebutt. However, informal efforts continued to meet a stone wall of resistance, so on the morning of July 28th a formal collection directive was handcarried to G-2. A copy of the Project was delivered to us that same afternoon minus the last page, which possibly showed a Distribution List from which CIA was excluded.
- 4. It is certain that we finally received this paper only because General Bolling had issued firm instructions to subordinate officers that no written request from CIA was to be turned down without his personal approval.
- 5. I believe that "Project 4831", which is now before us, might well be put to use as Exhibit A in any documented study of the Army's long continued intractability toward CIA. The Army itself has long argued that this Agency should rely primarily upon G-2's finished intelligence, rather than make demands for raw information of a departmental nature. The files are full of correspondence and studies presenting this view, yet "Project 4831" is finished military intelligence of the sort Army says we should receive, and it has been withheld from us until now.



- 6. <u>Project 4831</u> consists of 86 pages, plus cover sheet, plus a final page (missing from the copy given to us) which presumably showed a Distribution List from which CIA was excluded. It gives current estimates for nearly all countries of the world, except Latin America, and the estimates for each nation are broken down as follows:
  - 1. Leaders, (Political, Army, Navy & Air Force)
  - 2. Population
  - 3. Type and Stability of Government
  - 4. Communist Influence
  - 5. Budget, (National & Military)
  - 6. Munitions Industry
  - 7. Military Strength & Organization
  - 8. Army Disposition
  - 9. Trained Reserves
  - 10. Status of Arms and Equipment
  - Mobilization Capacity (Ground Forces) (Showing estimated number of troops of M-Day, M-plus-15, M-plus-30, M-plus-90, M-plus-180, and M-plus-360 days.)
  - 12. <u>Inventory of Arms and Equipment</u> (Artillery, Mortars, Rocket Launchers, Armor, Motor Transport)
- 7. In order to make the best use of the single copy of this paper which we have, it is being split up into five segments each of which will go to the ORE Geographic Division concerned. If in the view of ORE the estimates are of sufficient value to justify further pressure upon G-2, OCD will ask that distribution of future issues be stepped up to a total of five, to be routed as follows:
  - Copy 1: Global Survey ORE, return to Library
    - 2: Special Research Center
    - 3: Regional Divisions of ORE in segments
    - 4: OSĪ
    - 5: OSO, pass to OPC

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JAMES M. ANDREWS

- 2 -SECRET COMPEDENTIAL